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This article studies the production, legal and illegal trade, and provisioning of strategic mineral 
wolfram/tungsten both by the Allies and the Axis during World War II. It analyzes the case 
the world’s largest producer of this mineral, China, the trade agreements signed by Chiang 
Kai-shek before the war with Nazi Germany, the USSR and Britain and their evolution during 
the global conflict. It also analyzes Japan, its difficulties in obtaining Chinese wolfram and its 
dependence on Korea. As for Nazi Germany, it studies its supply of Chinese ore until 1941 and 
later in the Iberian Peninsula, a trade made difficult by the Allied preventive purchases in Spain 
and Portugal. The article also studies the case of the US, its progressive auto provisioning in the 
Western Hemisphere, the airlift established between China and India to extract tungsten and 
distribution of amounts of it in Britain and the USSR. Finally, the article includes an assess-
ment of the importance of tungsten within the set of strategic materials used by the contenders 
in the war and concludes that the Allied strategy hinder or prevent the provision of the enemy 
helped to reduce use and negatively affected the effectiveness of its machinery of war.
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This paper examines the procurement and sale of tungsten (also known as wolfram1) during the 
Second World War2. Tungsten was one of the most sought-after strategic minerals during this 
period, one badly needed by the most important belligerent countries –Germany, the United 
States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and Japan–3 who obtained it at different times 
from China4, the United States, Japanese-occupied Korea, British Burma, Bolivia, Portugal, 
Spain, the Union of South Africa, India and other countries or colonies. This strategic material 
was used as a component of special-purpose steels, essential in the production of armour-
piercing shells and in reinforcing tank armour, gun barrels and warship decks, as well as in the 
manufacture of light bulb filaments. Furthermore, and most importantly, it was used in machi-
ne tools that employed cemented tungsten carbide in cutting tools, with properties equivalent 
to those of diamond, for cutting steel and other materials5. 
This paper has its origins in historical research into the relationship between the United States 
and Francoist Spain during the Second World War, in which I addressed the implications of 
the Battle for Wolfram, the political and economic conflict that set the Allies (USA & UK) aga-
1 Both names will be used indistinctively throughout the text.
2 The author wishes to thank the help provided in different instances of the research by professors Xiao Zili (South 
China Normal University at Guangzhou), Yang Hongyun (Tianjin University), Nobuo Tajima (Seijo University), 
Haruo Tohmatsu (National Defense Academy of Japan), Kenichi Arakawa (Shiseikan University), Kazuhiro 
Nogami (Tokyo Metropolitan University), Naoya Izuoka (Keio University), Ken Ishida (Chiba University), Haruko 
Hosoda (Nihon University), Chad Denton (Yonsei University, Seoul), Joao Paulo Avelas Nunes (Universidade de 
Coimbra), Rafael García Pérez, Xoám Carmona Badía and Emilio Grandío Seoane (Universidade de Santiago 
de Compostela), Macià Riutort (Universidad Rovira i Virgili), David S. Painter and Aviel Roshwald (Georgetown 
University), and Mats Ingulstad (Norwegian University of Science and Technology); as well as the documentary 
director Paula Cons; and mining engineers Joaquín Eulalio Ruiz Mora and Diego Casal.
3 In the case of Japan it is understood not strictly as Japan proper but also as including the annexed territories of 
Korea and Taiwan and the so-called Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere (the annexed territories of Manchuria 
/ Manchukuo, the Japanese occupied territories in China –that is to say, Nanging’s China–, Burma, Philippines, 
and others) and the Japanese occupied Dutch and British colonies.
4 When talking about China, this refers to what is known as Free China –the territory not occupied by the Japanese–.
5 The adding of tungsten gives alloy-steels particular qualities, as toughness and resistance to heat and corrosion. 
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El artículo estudia la producción, comercio –legal e ilegal– y aprovisionamiento del mineral estra-
tégico wolframio/tungsteno tanto por parte de los de los Aliados como del Eje durante la Segunda 
Guerra Mundial. Analiza al mayor productor mundial de este mineral, China, los acuerdos co-
merciales firmados por Chiang Kai-shek en la preguerra con la Alemania nazi, la URSS y Gran 
Bretaña y la evolución de los mismos durante el conflicto mundial. Analiza igualmente a Japón, 
sus dificultades para hacerse con el wolframio chino y su dependencia de Corea. En cuanto a la 
Alemania nazi estudia su aprovisionamiento de mineral chino hasta 1941 y posteriormente en la 
península ibérica, dificultado por las compras preventivas aliadas en España y Portugal. Estudia el 
caso de EE. UU., su progresivo autoaprovisionamiento en el hemisferio occidental, el puente aéreo 
establecido entre China e India para extraer el wolframio y la distribución de cantidades del mismo 
en Gran Bretaña y la URSS. El artículo incluye una evaluación de la importancia del wolframio 
dentro del conjunto de materiales estratégicos utilizados por los contendientes en la guerra y con-
cluye que la estrategia aliada de dificultar o impedir el aprovisionamiento del enemigo contribuyó 
a disminuir su uso y lesionar la  efectividad de su maquinaria de guerra. 
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inst Franco from January to May of 19446. It was the most serious conflict between Allied and 
Neutral states during the war. It involved, on the Allied side, an embargo on the sales of US oil 
and petroleum products to Franco’s Spain, as a means of exerting pressure on the country to 
cease all exports of tungsten (both to the Allies and to Germany). In this way, the Allies hoped 
to leave the Nazis in short supply during the six months leading up to the Normandy landings 
and thereafter. During the embargo tensions were high between the US, which was opposed 
to yielding to Spanish counterproposals, and the UK, which favoured a less rigid embargo, per-
mitting limited exports to the enemy according to its own need for other imports from Spain, 
including pyrite, oranges and other products. While the embargo had a significant impact on 
the Spanish economy, it did not prevent Germany from continuing to import Spanish tungsten: 
although in theory Spain did not authorize shipments to either side whilst these negotiations 
were in process, in fact, secretly and via smuggling, quantities of the mineral continued to re-
ach Germany. In any case, the Spanish Battle for Wolfram had further consequences, because 
after it came to an end, the USA made radical changes in its policies towards Neutral nations, 
demanding (and achieving) an end their sales of raw materials and other products to the enemy. 
My research into Spanish wolfram sales to both sides led me to ask where Nazi Germany had 
obtained it before it did so in Spain and Portugal, and to pose questions about the global impor-
tance of tungsten during the Second World War. This resulted, firstly, in an investigation into 
Chinese wolfram, the most important in the world in terms of production and exports since 
1913; secondly, research into Japan’s procurement sources for tungsten, including the role of 
Korean deposits, and the constant smuggling of minerals originating in China; and finally, a stu-
dy of the evolution of the totality of Nazi Germany’s wolfram supplies, first in China and India 
and then in the two Iberian countries.
The case of Chinese wolfram exemplifies one of the two shifts in worldwide production of the 
mineral during the Second World War: for reasons we will explain, production in Asia, where 
there were rich deposits in China, Korea, Burma and Indochina, was eclipsed by the Americas, 
with deposits in the US, Bolivia and Argentina7. The second such shift involved Iberian wol-
fram (in the first instance Portuguese and then Spanish) when it became essential to a Nazi 
Germany that was unable to procure it in China, while at the same time, the Allies competed to 
obtain it, not so much because they needed it as in order to prevent the enemy from acquiring 
it in larger quantities. 
Possessing enough wolfram, or even a surplus, during the Second World War, contributed, in-
sofar as strategic materials did so within the general war effort, to the Allied victory. For its part, 
the Axis, while never exhausting its supplies of tungsten, was forced to use it less, especially in 
the manufacture of armour-piercing anti-tank missiles, but also in other war industries, which 
contributed to its defeat.
6 Thomàs, J. M. (2011). Roosevelt, Franco, and the End of the Second World War. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan. 
Spanish version: (2010). La Batalla del Wolframio: Estados Unidos y España de Pearl Harbor a la Guerra Fría (1941-
1947). Madrid: Cátedra.
7 This is derived from tables regarding the production of wolfram concentrates in the world by continent included 
in the book by Li, K.C., & Wang, Ch. Y. (1955). Tungsten. Its Geology, Ore-Dressing, Metallurgy, Chemistry, 
Analysis, Applications, and Economics. New York and London: Reinhold Publishing Corporation-Chapman & 
Hall, pp. 419-424. 
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1. Chinese tungsten and Nazi Germany, Japan, the 
Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United 
States
Since the beginning of the 20th century, China has been the world’s largest producer of tungs-
ten. Between 1913 and 1937 it accounted for 37 % of the world’s total output of wolfram 
concentrates8, producing 134,141 tonnes, followed by the British colony of Burma, with 17.4 
% (63,067 tonnes) and the USA with 10.8 per cent (30,067 tonnes). Other producers included 
Bolivia (7 % - 25,605 tonnes), British Malaya (5.7 % - 20,590 tonnes), Portugal (4.7 % - 16,991 
tonnes)9, Japan (3.5 % - 12,600 tonnes), Australia (3.3 % - 11,932 tonnes), Argentina (2 % - 
7,218 tonnes), Indochina (1.9 % - 6,922 tonnes), Spain (0.9 % - 3,900 tonnes) and the UK (0.9 
% - 3,395 tonnes). Within China, 95 % of the tungsten was extracted in the Nanling region, a 
mountainous area that includes part of the southern provinces of Kiangsi, Kwantung, Kwangsi, 
Yunnan and Hunan, the first having the largest wolfram deposits and supplying 70 % of the 
total output of wolframite, the mineral form in which tungsten is most commonly found in the 
region10. During the inter-war period Chinese wolfram had already become an object of desire 
for countries including Germany, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States, 
France, Italy, the Netherlands and Belgium. At the same time, fluctuations in its price were 
a barometer of expectations of peace or further wars, as occurred before and after the World 
Disarmament Conference in Geneva in 1932, when the prospects of an agreement first made 
the price fall and then –after talks failed– rise11. However, in China, wolfram production was 
not affected by the sudden slump in external demand that occurred in the rest of the producer 
countries at the end of the First World War, a slump that had been accompanied by a fall in 
prices, and by the closure of mines. Both the high quality of the mineral and low extraction 
costs, basically due to the low cost of Chinese labour, contributed to this effect12. On the other 
hand, production was temporarily affected by internal events, such as the civil war between 
the Communist Party of China and the government of the Republic of China that broke out 
in 1927, specifically between 1930 and 1934, when the main productive area, in the south of 
Kiangsi province, was occupied by the Red Army, which established a Soviet there. The encir-
clement of the area by Republican troops and the battles that took place there meant that many 
mines ceased production. Furthermore, the traditional (and less expensive) exit route for the 
mineral destined for export, transportation via river to reach Shanghai, was cut off, leaving only 
the alternative route, which led to Guangzhou by land. In fact tungsten production fell from 
10,000 tonnes (1929) to 4,700 (1934). However, when the Communists withdrew in October 
1934 to begin the Long March, production gradually recovered13. 
8 Wolfram is used in the form of concentrates, which are produced by treating the mineral after it has been separated 
from the impurities or other minerals it is associated with. The most common level of concentration is 60 % WO3.
9 Li-Wang, op. cit., p. 413
10 Another one, very common in other places of the world, is scheelite.
11 First, up to 70 yuans per dan (Dan: One Chinese mass unit. There were 2 kinds of dan in tungsten business. One 
is Kupingdan, another is Dan. 1 ton= 16.8 Kupingdan=10 dan), and afterwards, up to 130: Zili, X. (2008). The 
Head of Special Mineral: An Analysis on Development of Tungsten Industry in 1914-1919. (PhD Dissertation) Sun 
Yat-Sen University, p. 60. 
12 Zili, X. (2005). Development of Tungsten Industry in South Jiangxi Province in 1914-1949. The Journal of Chinese 
Social and Economic History, 3, 85-87.
13 Ibidem, p. 62.
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Despite this temporary disruption, the importance of tungsten to the Chinese government as 
a commodity exclusively for export and as a significant source of income meant that during 
the remainder of the 1930s, efforts were made to establish a centralised system to control pro-
duction. It was not a simple process, given the patchy and often weak influence that Chiang 
Kai-shek, the “Generalissimo” and supreme leader of the Republic, was able to bring to bear 
on certain areas of the country, which included the provinces where tungsten was produced. 
In fact, the provinces of Kiangsi and Kwantung had had their own controls from the late 1920s 
onwards, which had provoked complaints from business owners to the government of the Re-
public and, above all, a decline in production of the mineral. Centralised control –always limi-
ted– would not arrive until February 1936, in the shape of an Agreement on Control over the 
Tungsten Industry formulated by the Ministry of Economic Affairs, and passed by Executive 
Yuan’s fourteenth meeting, which would establish central control over tungsten and construct 
a legal system for the tungsten industry14. 
However, the government’s interest in the production and sale of wolfram went beyond its 
strictly commercial and fiscal aspects and was directly related both to the civil war affecting the 
country and to the complete occupation of Manchuria by Japan since 1931, with the threat that 
Japan posed to the stability and integrity of China. This threat took on a new and critical dimen-
sion with the outbreak, in July 1937, of the Second Sino-Japanese War (a war never formally 
declared by Japan) whereby the Japanese intended to seize the richest regions of the country. 
For this reason Chiang Kai-shek had sought ways of reorganising, training and equipping his 
armed forces with modern material and professional advice from overseas, to which end he had 
approached Germany, contracting military leaders and officers of the German armed forces. 
The most prominent among them was General Hans von Seeckt, the head of the mission sent 
by the German army, whom the Generalissimo named Adviser-general of the National Govern-
ment between 1934 and his death in December 1936.
Fortunately for Chinese interests, the Japanese invasion of 1937 and the subsequent war did 
not affect Chinese tungsten production until seven years later, during the final years of the 
Second World War, in 1944. Until that time, Japanese forces were unable to seize control of 
producer areas. During the previous seven years, tungsten in areas controlled by Japan only 
accounted for 0.1 % of the total reserves. It was in 1944, in the course of the Japanese army 
offensive known as Ichi-Go, when the richest reserves were affected. However, the conquests 
of 1937-1938 had indeed –once again– disrupted transport routes along which the mineral 
arrived at export centres. When Shanghai was occupied by the Japanese at the end of October 
1937, wolfram had to be redirected to Guangzhou; and when this city fell in October 1938, 
the tungsten route turned towards the British colonies of Hong Kong and Burma (specifically 
Rangoon), and French Indochina. For its part, the Chinese government, through the National 
Resources Corporation (NRC), sought –successfully– to guarantee and increase production of 
the mineral, granting incentives both to the miners and the mine owners, which took the shape 
of postponements of the call to military service, extra rice rations, and loans15. 
All of this, however, was not enough to forestall or halt the existence of a flourishing contraband 
market that derived from the pilfering of approximately 30 % of the output of Chinese tungsten 
14 Ibid., p. 189.
15 Ibid., p. 87.
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–according to figures from 1938– which originated in producer areas and was stimulated by 
the higher prices it was possible to obtain on the black market in Hong Kong, run in parallel 
to the colony’s official market. The mineral arrived after circumventing the NRC’s checks and 
being shipped in junks. Unsurprisingly, the country that took greatest advantage of the black 
market, in Hong Kong and later in the Portuguese colony of Macao or in British Rangoon, was 
Japan. In fact Japan’s contraband purchases continued throughout the world war, because after 
Japan occupied Hong Kong and Rangoon, wolfram continued to be smuggled there. As for legal 
purchases in the two British colonies, these continued until March 1941, at which time the 
United Kingdom banned them. 
The history of exports of Chinese tungsten to the Great Powers during the 1930s tracked de-
velopments in international politics during this tumultuous period; and of course, to an even 
greater extent, the not always stable alignments of the powers during the Second World War. 
As regards Nazi Germany, Hitler’s coming to power brought a renewed German interest in ob-
taining Chinese wolfram as part of the policy of rearmament and preparation for war. Germany 
had already used the mineral during the First World War, obtaining it during the pre-war period 
in the tungsten mines of Wales16 and purchasing it during the conflict –as did Austria-Hungary 
and the countries of the Entente– from Portugal and Spain17. But from 1933 onwards, it worked 
with renewed interest to sign trade agreements with China that would allow for wolfram and 
other strategic materials to be exchanged for arms and industrial products on a massive scale. 
At the same time, this new interest entailed a radical break from previous policies –those of the 
Weimar Republic and its army– that favoured the military relationship with the Soviet Union. 
These conversations with China took place with the central government and some provincial 
governments, especially with that of the principal wolfram-producing province, Kiangsi18. As a 
result, on 23 August 1934, the first agreement was signed –the Treaty for the Exchange of Chi-
nese Raw Materials and Agricultural Products for German Industrial and other Products– on 
the exchange of tungsten for arms and industrial products19. On the Chinese side, it was signed 
by a representative of the central government, and on the German side by the head of the Han-
delsgesellschaft für Industrielle Produkte (HAPRO), a consortium created by the army and the 
German economic ministries in order to group together all the official and private companies 
that were operating in China. Two years later, on 8 April 1936, the agreement was replaced by 
another, which was also based on barter, and would thus allow China to receive new weaponry 
and various kinds of industrial equipment without going into debt. However, on 25 November 
of the same year, Germany signed the Anti-Comintern pact with Japan, making it clear which 
strategic options took priority for Hitler in the Far East. This was a hard blow for the Chinese, 
who had not expected it. The fact was that the Fuhrer regarded Japan as a more important ally 
than China in a future war against the USSR. He had in mind Russia’s defeat by Japan in the 
1904-1905 war, and also regarded China as incapable of resisting Soviet attacks. Furthermore, 
16 Li-Wang, op. cit., xi; 
17 Caruana de las Cagigas, L., & González Calleja, E. (2014). La producción y contrabando de wolframio en España 
durante la Primera Guerra Mundial. Ayer, (95).
18 Zili, X. (2008). Nationalist government’s attempt on tungsten control and the establishment of tungsten control. 
Historical Research, 1, 116-117. In order to gain a complete insight of the negotiations, see Kirby, W. C. (1984). 
Germany and Republican China. Stanford: Stanford University Press, pp. 102-144.
19 Strauss, H. (2001). Deutschland und der Japanisch-chinesische Krieg. Seminararbeit, pp. 86-88.
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from a racial point of view, he considered the Japanese superior to the Chinese, whom he had 
compared to African Americans in his book Mein Kampf20. 
However, despite this clear inclination towards one of the two opposing sides then engaged in 
a war on Chinese territory, Germany did not break off commercial relations with China, and 
over the next two years would continue to obtain tungsten in exchange for supplying arms and 
industrial products. But these exchanges took place against a background of significant disa-
greements within the upper echelons of Nazi leadership. So while in 1938 the new Foreign 
Minister, Von Ribbentrop –who replaced Von Neurath– had granted diplomatic recognition to 
Manchukuo (the Japanese puppet state established in 1932 in Manchuria, another Chinese 
region occupied by the Japanese), and Goering –in charge of the Four Year Plan– had ordered 
that the deliveries of German war materials contracted under existing agreements should stop, 
and the military mission that worked closely with Chiang Kai-shek had been withdrawn during 
the following months of May and June…21 the need for wolfram as a key element for German 
industry and rearmament led the Wehrmacht and Finance Minister Funk to advocate the con-
tinuation of these agreements to Hitler, and had been successful. In fact, in October 1938 
HAPRO, with the approval of Funk and the opposition of Ribbentrop, had signed a new barter 
agreement to the value of 7.5 M Reichmarks a month22. 
Despite this, the cooling of relations was a fact, and brought about a decrease in the amount of 
Chinese wolfram arriving in Germany, which fell first from 8,962 tonnes in 1938 to 4,142 ton-
nes in 1939 and later, dramatically, after the outbreak of war in September 1939, to 420 tonnes 
in 194023. A key part in this decline was played by gradual establishment of a naval blockade by 
the United Kingdom, even though Germany struggled to circumvent it with blockade-running 
surface vessels and, later, with submarines. The Germans’ first attempt to maintain imports of 
Chinese wolfram during the war was to transport it through Soviet territory. This was possi-
ble thanks, on the one hand, to the economic agreement that complemented the Ribbentrop-
Molotov on 23 August 1939 as well as other pacts concluded in early 194024; but also and in 
particular, because of other agreements that were in effect, this time between China and the 
Soviet Union, dating from 1938 and 1939. Japan was also a factor. 
The routes used to transport the mineral were a maritime one from Hong Kong to Vladivostok 
(with cargos disguised as Soviet consignments to get around the British ban on supplying the 
enemy, in force since 1939), which connected to the trans-Siberian railway and then Germany; 
but also a land-only route that passed through the territory of Manchukuo to reach the USSR 
and, from there, Germany. On this latter route, the mineral was collected in Guiyang and trans-
ported to Xingxingxia, or originally to Hami, even further away. However, it seems that Japanese 
20 Kirby, op. cit., p. 140.
21 Ibidem, p. 235.
22 Ibid., p. 246
23 Id., p. 248.
24 On February 11th 1940 both countries signed a new economic agreement by virtue of which the USSR would 
deliver “larger quantities of oil, grain, timber, iron and various non-ferrous ores. Also, it would offer transit facilities 
for certain raw materials from the Middle East and the Far East –notably rubber and a million tons of soybeans 
from Manchuria–” Wright, G. (1968). The Ordeal of Total War 1939-1945. New York: Harper & Row, p. 57.
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cooperation was not especially active25, probably due to its own need for Chinese tungsten26. In 
any case, the end of the trade between China and Germany would not come until shortly after 
the Nazis attacked the USSR, when China declared war on Germany.
In parallel to the efforts it made to maintain its agreement with Nazi Germany, but also in light 
of the uncertainty into which the relationship had been plunged since 1936-1938, Chiang Kai-
shek’s government reacted by signing new trade agreements for the sale of tungsten and other 
strategic materials to other countries. Between 1938 and the outbreak of the Pacific War –after 
the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941– it signed economic treaties with 
the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States. The first two were, similarly to 
those signed with Germany, barter agreements, exchanging military and industrial equipment 
for tungsten and agricultural and mineral products. By contrast, those signed with the United 
States were different: China would sell wolfram (as well as tung oil and tin) and with the profits 
they obtained pay off the loans granted by the US for the purchase of arms27. 
With the Soviet Union –which had no tungsten deposits within its own territory and needed the 
mineral urgently– and within the framework of the Sino-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of August 
1937, China signed three agreements, two in 1938 (1 March and 1 July) and a third in 1939 (13 
June), to a value of 250 million dollars, which would be paid off by the Chinese with wolfram, 
antimony and tin28. In exchange, China received 600 aircraft, 1,000 guns and howitzers and 
8,000 machine guns, as well as Soviet military attachés and air crews29. However, when Ger-
many attacked the Soviet Union in June 1941, it cut off Soviet military assistance to China, as 
well as the trans-Siberian railway30 and thereafter Chinese wolfram would arrive in the USSR 
by slower routes and, in particular, as we will see, by a new route, involving nothing less than 
an airlift, conducted by the US.
The Chinese government signed two agreements on tungsten with the United Kingdom –in Au-
gust 1939 and in June 1941– to a value of 6 million pounds. Rather than procuring the mineral 
for themselves –they obtained 77 % of their supplies31 from the colonies in Burma, the Malay 
States and Straits Settlement, and a smaller proportion from Welsh mines– Britain’s greatest 
concern after the outbreak of war in 1939 was firstly, to prevent Nazi Germany and (after spring 
1941) Japan from obtaining the tungsten that was leaving by sea from Hong Kong, Rangoon or 
any other British or Allied colonial port. For this reason, from the beginning of the war onwards 
25 Akira, K. (2009). The Reality of Wartime Economic Cooperation: From Germany’s Blitzkrieg Victory to its War 
with the Soviet Union. In Kudo Akira, Tajima Nobuo, Erich Pauer (Eds.). Japan and Germany. Two Latecomers to 
the World Stage, 1890-1945 (Volume I: ‘A Chance Encounter in East Asia’) (p. 344). Folkestone: Global Oriental.
26 The Japanese provided only few ships monthly for the transport of goods to Vladivostok, language difficulties, lack 
of trained personnel, delay in transit permits, and considerable mistrust among German, Russian, and Japanese 
officials: Kirby, op. cit., p. 244.
27 Xiao Zili, “The head…” Cit., p. 203.
28 Ibidem.
29 Fallin, Soviet Peace Efforts on the eve of World War II (September 1938-August 1939), Documents and Records, 
Novosti Press Agency Publishing House (19739: 45) cit. Bingyan Cai, The Search for Allies: Chinese Alliance 
Behavior from 1930 to the End of WWII. A Professional Paper Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements 
for the Degree of Master of Arts In Diplomacy and military Studies (Hawai’I Pacific University, 2009), p. 45-46.
30 Chou Whei-Ming, Ch. (2009). The Wang Jing-wei regime and the German Japanese Alliance. In Kudo Akira, 
Tajima Nobuo, Erich Pauer (Ed.). Japan and Germany. Two Latecomers to the World Stage, 1890-1945 (p. 373). 
Folkestone: Global Oriental.
31 Hurstfield, J. (1953). The Control of Raw Materials. London: Her Majesty Stationery Office and Longmans, Green 
and Co., p. 167.
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they established a system of export licences, a system that would not, however, succeed in pre-
venting ongoing tungsten smuggling, which placed a not inconsiderable percentage of Chinese 
output on the international market, at prices that were between 10 and 20% lower than the 
official ones –a circumstance that furthermore placed downward pressure on the prices set by 
the Chinese NRC–. Throughout 1940, the British government had been unsure how to prevent 
this illegal trade out of Hong Kong, and contemplated the creation of a body that would pur-
chase all the wolfram that arrived there, but feared that this would displace the black market 
to Macao. Meanwhile, it demanded that Japan agree to use the tungsten purchased legally in 
the colony solely for domestic consumption, and prohibited it from ceding the mineral to third 
countries (in other words, Nazi Germany). Japan formally accepted these demands… while 
continuing its purchases on the black market, and continuing to send mineral to Germany via 
the USSR, or via blockade-runners. The situation was to change, however, in March 1941 when 
the British ceased to grant wolfram export licences to Japan and decided to create the Metals 
Purchasing Board in Hong Kong, the body through which they intended the NRC to control 
all tungsten purchases in the colony, to sell it to the United States afterwards. This did not pre-
vent the Japanese from continuing to get hold of varying amounts of smuggled mineral either. 
But after Pearl Harbor, Japanese prospects would improve once again, after the occupation of 
Hong Kong (25 December, 1941), Rangoon (7 March, 1942) and the whole of Lower Burma. 
Furthermore, the following April, the Japanese advanced north and cut off the Burma Road, the 
land route that connected Burma and China, a route whose construction had begun following 
the outbreak of war between China and Japan, it objective being for Chinese products to be 
able to get around the Japanese naval blockade. The route had been operational since 1939. 
With the road cut off, and the Japanese occupation of most of British Burma, the arrival of 
Chinese wolfram in the United Kingdom came to depend entirely on the United States. 
The United States –the world’s third-largest producer of wolfram in the pre-war period, whose 
output would almost equal that of China during the Second World War– signed three commer-
cial agreements with Chiang Kai-shek’s government after 1939, relating mainly to tungsten, as 
well as a further two on products such as tung oil (the agreement of 25 February 1939 to the 
value of 25 million dollars in exchange for 220,000 tonnes) and tin (that of 20 April 1940 to 
the value of 20 million dollars32 in exchange for 40,000 tonnes). The first of those relating to 
wolfram –that of 22 October 1940– followed a request from Chiang Kai-shek made immedia-
tely after Japan’s signing of the Tripartite Pact on 27 September 1940 and the occupation of 
the northern part of French Indochina –held by the Vichy government– at the end of the same 
month; an occupation that cut railway links to China33. In this first deal, the United States 
granted China a 25 million dollar loan in exchange for 30 million dollars’ worth of tungsten. 
The second agreement, of 30 November 1940, consisted of a 100 million dollar loan, again in 
exchange for tungsten as well as antimony and tin34. But the most important agreement came 
shortly after Pearl Harbor, in early 1942, when the United States granted a third loan, extre-
32 Marshall, J. (1995). To have and have not. Southeast Asian Raw Materials and the Origins of the Pacific War. Berkeley 
and London: University of California Press, pp. 39-40. 
33 In June 1940 the US had carried off a large consignment of Chinese wolfram stockpiled in French Indochina, 
taking it before the Germans and Japanese could do so. This audacious operation led to the Vichy regime’s removal 
–at German insistence– of the governor, General Georges Catroux, and his replacement by Admiral Jean Decoux. 
The four merchant vessels sent by the US to transport the wolfram were pursued by the Imperial Navy, without 
success: Li-Wang, op. cit., p. xiv-xv.
34 Marshall, op. cit., p. 40.
In this  first deal, 
the United States 
granted China a 25 
million dollar loan 
in exchange for 
30 million dollars’ 
worth of tungsten
Comillas Journal of International Relations | nº 10 | 065-090 [2017] [ISSN 2386-5776]  74
mely generous and of the utmost strategic value, to the value of 500 million dollars, without 
specifying its purpose except in the most general terms: “to assist in the war against Japan and 
to contribute to the stabilization of China’s wartime economy”35. Of this sum, a considerable 
proportion was dedicated to the purchase of tungsten and other Chinese mineral and agricul-
tural products. 
In total, between 1938 and 1945, the United States granted China 1,500 million dollars in 
loans, not counting the 846 million in materials and services supplied under the Lend-Lease law, 
beginning a month after the law was passed in March 194136. After the United States entered 
the war, there were two exit routes for Chinese goods: the air route to which I have referred 
above, which was the principal one, and a land route. On the former, aircraft carried wolfram 
concentrate from China to eastern India and from there to the north by railway, to the west 
coast of the subcontinent, from where it was shipped to the United States, Great Britain and 
the USSR. On the latter, the mineral was sent north to the Soviet Union. The air route soon 
became known as “The Hump” because the aircraft flew over the Himalayas
In short, most of the Chinese tungsten –with the exception of that smuggled by the Japanese– 
ended up in the hands of United States, which used it in industry but also distributed some to 
the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom during 1942, 1943 and the first months of 1944. 
Thereafter, from mid-1944 onwards, the USSR would be the main beneficiary, receiving all the 
wolfram extracted from China, as result of the oversupply of the mineral in the United States.
The United States’ interest in Chinese wolfram, and the organisation of the airlift to export 
it, should be placed in the context of the general mobilisation into which the country flung 
itself immediately after Pearl Harbor. At the end of 1941 Secretary of State Cordell Hull had 
approached Chiang Kai-shek, offering to purchase wolfram and other raw materials needed for 
the US war effort on a massive scale. He had two aims: procurement for his own industries, 
and the extraction of minerals from producer areas that were liable to fall into Japanese hands. 
Faced by the same threat, and in their own Asian colonies, both the British and the Dutch had 
reacted by applying a scorched earth policy when the Japanese began their advance towards 
Burma, Malaya and the Dutch East Indies. In fact, production of the first two would –for this 
very reason– be greatly reduced throughout the rest of the conflict37. But it was only after the 
fall of Rangoon38 and the cutting off of the sea route to its port, as well as the Burma Road, that 
the United States had decided to activate the new air route between China and India39. On 
the 20-25 March 1942, meetings were held in Chungking –the seat of the government of Free 
35 “Summary of United States Government and Military Aid Authorized for China since 1937” January 1950. State 
Department Memorandum quoted in Kirby, W.C. (2015). The Chinese War Economy. In James C. Hsiung & 
Steven I. Levine, China’s bitter victory. The war with Japan 1937-1945. London: Routledge, p. 200 (reprint from 
Taylor & Francis, 1992); Schaller, M. (1979). The United States and China in the Twentieth Century. New York: 
Oxford University Press, p. 72. 
36 “Second Report under the Act of March 11, 1941 (Lend-Lease Act)”, Academia Sinica, Institute of Modern 
History, Mei guo jun yuanhua (The American military and financial assistance to China), Box 1, 23-4 quoted in 
Chen Hao (2015). Negotiating for Alliance. Republican China’s Relations with National Socialist Germany and the 
United States, 1937-1941. Montreal: MA Th, McGill University, p. 80. 
37 Li-Wang, op. cit., p. 422.
38 US Embassy Chungking to State Department, April 19, 1942. RG 234 Records of the Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation. Metals Reserve Company. National Archives and Records Administration (NARA-2). 
39 Telegram State Department US Ambassador to Chungking December 27, 1941; telegram US Embassy Chungking 
to State Department, December 31, 1941. RG 234 Records of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. Metals 
Reserve Company. National Archives and Records Administration (NARA-2). 
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China– between Lieutenant general Stilwell –head of the US Military Mission to China, Lend-
Lease supervisor and Chiang Kai-shek’s Allied chief of staff– Dr Wong Wen-hao –Minister of 
Economic Affairs and Chairman de la NRC– and Teichman, an adviser at the British Embassy, 
to organise the airlift, which would link the Chinese airport of Dinjan with aerodromes in the 
India state of Assam, and, from there, by train, to the ports of Bombay and Karachi. From there, 
the goods would be shipped to the United States, arriving two to three weeks later. A proportion 
would then be sent on to the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union.
At that time, in March 1942, there were 5,150 tonnes of wolfram in China awaiting transport, 
and to begin the process, 25 aircraft carrying US war supplies were to arrive in Kunming. They 
would then return to India carrying tungsten and other minerals. It was also in these meetings 
that the opening of land route to connect China and India, passing through Higher Burma, was 
first suggested40; a road that would be built and would be known as Ledo (the name of the In-
dian town and railway terminal where it was to end) Road or Stilwell Road. This route, however, 
would not be completed until 1945. 
As a result, depending exclusively on the air route, the transport of Chinese wolfram was or-
ganised, between July 1942 and February 1943, under contract to the official China National 
Aviation Corporation (CNAC), by the US Company Pan American Airways. The transport was 
in fact paid for by the United States with funds from the Metals Reserve Company of the Board 
of Economic Warfare41. Later, from the second of the dates mentioned and until the end of the 
war, the CNAC used between 24 and 26 aircraft supplied through the Lend-Lease agreement 
for the Services of Supply, United States Army Forces in China, Burma and India. The trade-off 
was always the same: the aircraft carried military supplies from India and returned with consig-
nments of wolfram, antimony and tin42 via a 500 mile air bridge43. 
However, as we have mentioned, over this two-and-a-half-year period the United States went 
from urgently needing Chinese wolfram to a situation of oversupply. This accumulation of 
stocks was caused both by increased production in the country’s own mines (which during 1942 
and 1943 had been able to produce 8,467 and 10,836 tonnes of wolfram concentrates respec-
tively) and by imports of wolfram from Bolivia (producing 5,606 and 6,902 tonnes in the same 
period) and Argentina (2,115 and 2,390 tonnes)44… and also, to a certain extent, by the Chine-
se taking advantage of the agreement to send wolfram in larger quantities than those agreed for 
each year45. In fact, by August 1943, US authorities estimated that total wolfram imports for the 
40 Enclosure n. 1 to dispatch n. 330 March 24, 1942 US Embassy Chungking to State Department. RG 234 
Records of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. Metals Reserve Company. National Archives and Records 
Administration (NARA-2). 
41 State Department and Board of Economic Warfare authorization July 8, 1942 included in Memorandum from 
Metals Reserve Corporation to Treasury Department April 4, 1943. RG 234 Records of the Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation. Metals Reserve Company. National Archives and Records Administration (NARA-2). 
42 Memorandum by Second Secretary of Embassy in China, December 12th, 1944. Foreign Relations of the United 
States (FRUS) 1944, vol. VI China, p. 202-205.
43 Contract between China National Aviation Corporation and Service of Supply American Army Forces in China, 
Burma, and India. February 17, 1943. RG 234 Records of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. Metals 
Reserve Company. National Archives and Records Administration (NARA-2). 
44 Li-Wang, op. cit., p. 419.
45 Telegram Foreign Economic Administration to US Embassy Chungking November 24, 1943. RG 234 Records of 
the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. Metals Reserve Company. National Archives and Records Administration 
(NARA-2). 
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whole year would reach 27,150,000 pounds, when projected consumption was 22,000,00046. 
By 1944 the situation was even worse, with projected imports at 47 million pounds, and con-
sumption at 24 million… a figure soon lowered to 19, a level it was possible to cover from the 
country’s own production and imports from Bolivia and Argentina47. But this did not alter the 
United States’s commitment to extracting wolfram and other minerals from Chinese territory48. 
The solution to the oversupply problem was to send most of the tungsten extracted in 1944 to 
the Soviet Union and, in 1945, to send all of it. In fact, in 1944 the United States kept only 
1,623,000 pounds of Chinese tungsten while the USSR received 11,550,00049. 
However, during the last year of the war, the production and transportation of wolfram in Free 
China was seriously compromised by Japanese military operations; specifically by the Ichi-Go 
campaign, the series of three separate battles in the Chinese provinces of Henan, Hunan and 
Guangxi intended to connect Japanese occupied areas in China with French Indochina, and 
capture air bases in southeast China from which American bombers were attacking the Japane-
se homeland and shipping. Fighting affected wolfram producer areas, and cities such as Dayu 
and Ganzhou in Jiangxi Province, Nanxiong and Lechang in Guangdong Province, fell in 1944 
or 1945. China’s tungsten industry was almost brought to a complete halt. According Xiao Zili, 
mines in Jiang Province ceased production in the summer of 1944: 
On 3rd July, Tungsten Management Office’s Eighth office in south Jiangxi Branch received an 
order, commanding it to stop purchasing tungsten, dismiss the miners and shut down the mi-
nes temporarily due to the transportation problem and difficulty of getting money. Yaogangxian 
Mine was forced to stop when Henyang in Hunan Province fell in August 1944. Zhengjiang 
Company and Minsheng Company were two tungsten companies that operated the longest in 
Guidong, Hunan Province. They never stopped producing tungsten since the First World War. 
These two companies stopped the business successively in 1944 when the battles became wor-
se, the transportation became harder, and the market demand was small50. 
In fact, output in 1944 and 1945 would only be a third of 1943’s, falling from 9,734 tonnes in 
1943 to 3,502 and 2,929 respectively. Whether the Japanese were able to obtain this tungsten 
was another matter, and appears not to have been the case, as we shall explain below.
46 US Embassy Chungking to Foreign Economic Administration, August 7, 1943 RG 234 Records of the 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation. Metals Reserve Company. National Archives and Records Administration 
(NARA-2). 
47 Memorandum to Major Gunderson quoting Combined Raw Materials Board-War Production Board-Tungsten 
Branch figures. December 4, 1943. RG 234 Records of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. Metals Reserve 
Company. National Archives and Records Administration (NARA-2). 
48 Ibidem. 
49 Air Transportation of Strategic Materials from China to India. Reports. RG 234 Records of the Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation. Metals Reserve Company. National Archives and Records Administration (NARA-2). 
50 Xiao, Zili. The Head of Special Mineral… cit., p. 63
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Table 1. China’s foreign loans involving tungsten ore before the pacific war






7,5 M Reichm/month Not limited 1939
50% agricultural products; 
50% mineral products.
Soviet Union
March, 1 1938 U.S.$50 million 5 1943 50% agricultural products; 50% mineral products.
July,1 1938 U.S.$50 million 7 1945 50% agricultural products; 50% mineral products.
June, 13 1939 U.S.$150 million 13 1952 50% agricultural products; 50% mineral products.
Britain
August, 18 1939 ₤3 million 15 1954 50% agricultural products; 50% mineral products.
June, 5 1941 ₤3 million 15 1956 50% agricultural products; 50% mineral products.
United 
States
February, 9 1939 U.S.$25 million 5 1944 220,000 tons of tung oil
April, 20 1940 U.S.$20 million 7 1947 40,000 tons of Yunnan Tin
September, 25- 
October, 22 1940 U.S.$25 million 5 1945
U.S.$30 million worth of 
tungsten ores
November, 30 
194051 U.S.$100 million 7 1948
tungsten, tin and 
antimony.
February 1941 U.S.$500 million agricultural and mineral products, Tungsten
Sources: Zili, X. (2008). The Head of Special Mineral: An Analysis on Development of Tungsten Industry in 1914-1919. 
(Ph D Dissertation) Sun Yat-Sen University, p. 201; USSR 150 M credit in: Sun, Ke, Zongsu Guanxi [Sino-Soviet 
Relations] (Shanghai: Zhonghua Shuju, 1946), pp. 513-514; Marshall, J. (1995). To have and have not. Southeast Asian 
Raw Materials and the Origins of the Pacific War. Berkeley Los Angeles: University of California Press, pp. 39-40.51
2. Japan, Korean tungsten and the continued 
smuggling of Chinese tungsten
Japan, unlike the United States (which had deposits in its own territory) and Nazi Germany 
and the Soviet Union (whose ability to produce their own was insignificant) but like the United 
Kingdom (which had wolfram in some of its colonies), had access to considerable amounts 
of tungsten in its foreign possessions. And in one in particular: Korea. At the same time, in 
contrast to Great Britain’s situation with respect to its wolfram-producing colonies, the Korean 
peninsula was close to the Japanese mainland and, five years after occupation in 1905, Japan 
annexed Korea, so formally it was part of the country. Korea provided 60 per cent of the tungs-
ten Japan required, with production continually rising after 1934, reaching maximum levels ten 
years later at 8,403 tonnes of wolfram concentrate52. Mainland Japan had small deposits of its 
51 The signing dates of the contracts between China and the US do not match in all the sources. According to 
two letters from the Metals Reserve Corporation to the US Commercial Corporation dated April 14th 1944, 
when the transfer of the management of the programs of New Caledonia and China to the USCC, they were: 
10/22/1940; 1/31/1941; and 6/4/1941: Metals Reserve Corporation to USCC April 19, 1944. RG 234 Records of 
the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. Metals Reserve Company. National Archives and Records Administration 
(NARA-2). 
52 Li-Wang, op. cit., p. 422.
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own –which supplied another 10 %– while to meet the rest of its needs, before the outbreak of 
the Pacific war, it depended on imports from British colonies –including Burma, Malaya and 
Hong Kong– the United States, Bolivia, the Philippines53 and China. At the same time, and as 
we have described, legal procurement from this last country was interrupted in 1937 after the 
invasion, as a result of which Japan had to purchase Chinese tungsten in Hong Kong and other 
colonies, both legally and through non-official channels. 
In 1939, with the outbreak of the war in Europe, the transport of tungsten by sea to the West 
had become difficult and risky, and as a result the amount of the mineral available in Hong 
Kong, Macao and Rangoon increased. This allowed the Japanese to acquire larger quantities of 
wolfram, both legally and illegally. In Hong Kong in particular, Japan became the principal pur-
chaser of wolfram: between January and April 1940 alone, it acquired 606 tonnes54 [3998] and 
around 1,400 dans of tungsten were transported to Japan from Hong Kong each month, equi-
valent to 1,000 tonnes a year55. And when in March 1941, Britain banned Japanese purchases 
of the mineral in the colony, they used Macao and Kwangchowwan as supply lines, as well as 
organising extraction operations in Tamshui (Sancho Islands)56, which was in their possession. 
As we know, a small proportion of the wolfram obtained by Japan was sent to Germany via 
the USSR or via blockade-runners57. Later, after the outbreak of the Pacific war and Japan’s 
conquest of much of Burma, the Dutch Indies and other territories, as well as the Ichi-Go cam-
paign in territories in south east China, the Japanese significantly increased their ability to ob-
tain large quantities of wolfram, but the scorched earth policy practised by the British and the 
Dutch in Burma and Malaya and, later, the naval blockade and attacks on Japanese shipping, 
prevented the arrival of the mineral in large quantities to the Japanese mainland. Nevertheless, 
the smuggling of Chinese tungsten remained a constant throughout the war58. 
As a result of these difficulties and of the growing demands of its war industries, Japan’s depen-
dence on Korean wolfram increased. And while Korean production tripled within a few years 
–reaching 7,000 tonnes in 194359, whereas in 1937 it had stood at about 2,000–60 and with an 
increase –within Korea itself– of production the special steel that contained wolfram (with a 
capacity of 20,000 tonnes in 1943) this could never make up for the deficit, which remained at 
53 Montis Ruhl Kleeper (1947). Tungsten Resources of Japan. (Report no. 77. Tokyo, General Headquarters, Supreme 
Commander for the Allied Powers, Natural Resources Section, 1947), pp. 1, 6, 7. 
54 Report “Hong Kong Wolfram May 31, 1941” from P. C. Sedwick Colonial Administrative Service to S. Strauss US 
Embassy Chungking. RG 234 Records of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. Metals Reserve Company. 
National Archives and Records Administration (NARA-2). 
55 Around 1,400 dans of tungsten were transported to Japan from Hong Kong each month, which means 1,000 
tonnes in a year: Zili, X. (2007). Japan looted China’s tungsten ores and how Nationalist government responded in 
wartime. The Journal of Studies of China’s Resistance War Against Japan, 1, 140-143.
56 Report “Hong Kong…” cit.
57 The main raw material transported from the Far East was natural rubber, but also varying quantities of edible 
oils, wolfram, tin, opium and quinine arrived: Martin Brice, Axis Blockade runners of World War II (London: BT. 
Brantsford, 1981), p. 151; see also Kudo, op. cit., p. 374; and Dietrich Eichholtz, Geschichte Der Deutschen 
Kriegswirtschaft 1939-1945, Band III: 1939-1945, Tel 2 (Saur, 1999).
58 Xiao, Zili. “Japan looted…” cit.
59 7,056 exactly, according to Chad Denton in his article (2013). More Valuable than Gold. Korean Tungsten and 
the Japanese War Economy, 1910 to 1945. Seoul Journal of Korean Studies, 2(26), 3.819; or 6,932 according to 
Li-Wang (op. cit., p. 422).
60 2,058 according to Harold Glenn Moulton-Louis Marlio (1944). The Control of Germany and Japan. Washington 
DC: Brookings Institution, p. 68; or 1,590 according to Li-Wang (op. cit., p. 422).
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35 % for the duration of the war61. This forced Japan to reduce the amount used in alloys and 
to replace some elements with other combinations. 
At the same time it is important to remember that, as in Germany and the other belligerent 
countries, in Japan, the procurement of tungsten or any other raw material was not the most 
fundamental limiting factor in the war economy. For Japan, this was its very low iron and steel 
production62. As a result, Japan had to make cuts in its programs of shipbuilding and ammu-
nition, to reduce the number of warships, and to have more cargo ships because there was not 
enough steel for both; the country also had to make cuts in heavy artillery and armoured combat 
vehicles to boost aircraft production. A great deal of rivalry, administrative problems and bicke-
ring arose from the fact that Japan only produced 1/13 of what the US could63. Furthermore, in 
respect of raw materials, as B. Cohen states: 
[…] shortages of other strategic minerals like chromium, nickel, vanadium, titanium and mo-
lybdenum led to a decline in the quality of the alloy steels used in engine production, landing 
gears, motors mounts and terminal fittings. It was a combination of bad foresight and poor plan-
ning: 2 or 3 shiploads a year of tungsten concentrates would have provided a large stockpile. In 
fact, the blockade together with the mining of ports, attacks on shipping, and to a lesser extent, 
aerial bombardment of arms factories, would led to the gradual collapse of the Japanese war 
economy, but only during the last year of the conflict64. 
Table 2. Tungsten ores transported to japan from Hong Kong from 1938 to 1940
Time Quantity (Dan) Value (Yuan) Data Sources
1938 September-December 725  \ (Hong Kong) “Sing Tao Daily” 17th July, 1939, page 12
1939 January-June 513 75,337 (Hong Kong) “Sing Tao Daily” 17th July, 1939, page 12
1939 September-December 7,893 1,845,868 (Hong Kong) “Sing Tao Daily” 17th July, 1939, page 3 
1940 January-February 8,073 Around 1,880,000
Xu Xiuling’s, How to stop smuggling in South 
China quoted from Qi Chunfeng’s Smuggling in 
Sino-Japanese Economic War (1937-1945), p. 
244-P247
1940 March-April 8,073 1,882,157 (Hong Kong) “Sing Tao Daily” 23rd August, 1940, page 2 
Total 25,285
Source: Zili, X. (2007). Japan looted China’s tungsten ores and how Nationalist government responded in wartime. 
The Journal of Studies of China’s Resistance War Against Japan, 1, 140-143.
61 US Stategic Bombing Survey, Coals and Metals in Japan’s War Economy, p. 2.
62 Cohen, B. (1949). Japan’s economy in war and reconstruction. Minneapolis: Jerome University of Minnesota, p. 
114.
63 Ibidem, p. 124.
64 Ibid.
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3. Germany after the end of large-scale tungsten 
procurement in Chinese: Iberia
Unlike the United States, Germany had only tiny deposits of tungsten in its own territory. 
However, it was able to take over some small deposits in countries it occupied in 1940, as was 
the case in France. While for Germany the most important strategic mineral for arms produc-
tion was not tungsten but chrome65, tungsten was indispensable in the manufacture of high-
speed machine tools66, and as a component of some types of ammunition (the tips of anti-tank 
projectiles) and armour. We still do not know how much tungsten German industry needed 
before the Second World War; on the other hand, we do know, as we have already seen, that 
from 1936 onwards it procured supplies principally in China, but also in other countries, in-
cluding, on a small scale, the Iberian Peninsula. Specifically, in 1937 it imported 8,037 tonnes 
from China, 1,229 from India, 304 from Portugal and, lastly, 141 from Spain67, where Hitler 
had been supplying military aid to General Franco during the Civil War in exchange for a range 
of mineral and agricultural products68, which included wolfram. With China, Germany forma-
lised the barter agreements described above, with which it was able to guarantee its supplies 
for three years. Thereafter, as we have seen, it would receive small quantities of the mineral via 
the USSR and Japan, because the outbreak of the World War had blocked direct access to the 
Chinese market and the remaining Asian and South American markets.
We can appreciate the impact that the loss of the Chinese market had for Germany in the 
following table:
Table 3. German wolfram imports. Total and from china 1933-1939 (1,000 tons)




China 1,9 2,5 4,8 5,1 8 9 6,3 7,3
Total 3,8 4,4 7,9 8,7 11,4 14,2 8,9 7,3
Source: Re-done from Jäger, J. (1969). Die wirtschaftliche Abhängigkeit des Dritten Reiches von Ausland. Dargestellt am 
Beispiel der Stahlindustrie. Berlin: Berlin Verlag, p. 157.
65 Chrome (…) is the very base of all alloy-steels. Without chrome a highly developed armament industry cannot be kept 
functioning (…) The loss of the Balkans –and consequently the loss of Turkish deliveries- would mean that (…) after 
having used the raw-blocks in store (…) the various most important armament industry branches; aircraft, panzers, 
motor-vehicles, anti-tank shells, U-boats, nearly all artillery-guns would gradually have to stop production about 1-3 
months after the date mentioned, having used up all reserves: Speer Document (Flensburg), November 12th 1943. 
Imperial War Museum D-FD 2690/45 (11) (G2), translated from German; Alfred E. Eckes Jr. (1979). The United 
States and the Global Struggle for Minerals. Austin and London: University of Texas Press, p. 116.
66 Milward, A. S. (1967). The German Economy at War. London - University of London: The Athlone Press, p. 13; 
Moulton-Marlio, op. cit., p. 23. 
67 Einhorn, M. (1962). Die ökonomischen Hintergründe der faschistischen deutschen Intervention in Spanien 1936-
1939. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, p. 204.
68 Carmona Badía, X. (2003). La minería española del wolframio, 1936-1954: los años de la fiebre. In Glicerio Sánchez 
Recio and Julio Tascón Fernández (Eds.), Los empresarios de Franco. Política y economía en España 1936-1957 (pp. 
261-280). Barcelona: Crítica-Publicaciones de la Universidad de Alicante; Carmona Badía, X., Nadal Oller, J. (2005). 
El empeño industrial de Galicia. 250 años de historia, 1750-2000. Fundación Pedro Barrié de la Maza; 
 García Pérez, R. (1994). Franquismo y Tercer Reich. Las relaciones económicas hispano-alemanas durante la Segunda 
Guerra Mundial. Madrid: Centro de Estudios Constitucionales; Catalán, J. (1995). La economía española y la Segunda 
Guerra Mundial. Barcelona: Ariel; Grandío Seoane, E., Zone, W. (2012). La Segunda Guerra Mundial en el noroeste 
la Península Ibérica. Madrid: Eneida; Rodríguez Pérez, J. A. (1985). A minaria do volfrámio em Galiza (1887-1960). 
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But the cutting of supply lines was not immediate and even in 1942 Germany was able to re-
ceive 1,000 tonnes from the Far East by sea via blockade-runners69, although this route had be-
come less and less successful as the effectiveness of the Allied blocked increased. So Germany 
had to resort to the use of submarines, with much lower cargo capacity than their merchant 
vessels and involving crossings whose outcome was much more variable70. Thus from late 1941 
and 1942 Germany’s principal source for tungsten procurement became the largest deposits 
of the mineral in Western Europe, those located in Portugal and Spain71. This allowed the 
Germans to fulfil their essential procurement needs. However, the fact that in accessing the 
Iberian market Germany suddenly came into competition with the Allies meant that purchasing 
levels were lower than would have been desirable, which entailed continued depletion of the 
wolfram stocks available to the German war industries. Whereas before the outbreak of war the 
country had been able to build up three-year stockpiles of tungsten-alloy steel (as well as other 
strategic minerals) and take full advantage of them during the first years of the war72, Blitzkrieg 
and the intensive use of these resources had depleted the reserves, which could not be restored 
to previous levels73, as can be seen in the following two tables:
Table 4. Germany’s tungsten supplies and consumption during 1939-1941 (in thousand of tons)
1939 1940 1941
Consumption 4.2 3.7 3.4
Annual addition to stock 2.7 0.9 1
Source: United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS). (1945). The Effects of Strategic Bombing on the German 
Economy. Washington: Government Printing Office, p. 264. 
Table 5. German wolfram stocks (1939-1944) in tons
1939 (3rd quarter) 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1944 (3rd quarter)
5,506 5,006 3,058 2,700 1,640 1,457 1,360
Source: Statistische Schnellberichte zur Kriegsproduktion: Jahresheft 1939-1945, [Quick Statistical Reports on War 
Production: Annual Issue, 1939-1945], Speer Documents (Hertford Series), Imperial War Museum, IWM-D 
FD3039/49, Section III/98, p. 23.
All this led Germany to begin to rationalise its use of tungsten in the production of anti-tank 
armour-piercing shells, from at least 194374. In fact, only the production of 5cm calibre shells 
–able to pierce the armour of the heavy Russian tanks– and one other type was permitted75. Ex-
69 Leitz, op. cit., p. 177, n25.
70 Brice, op. cit.
71 This was, as we have seen, merely to revert to the norm established both by Germany itself and the Austro-
Hungarian Empire, France and Great Britain, during the First World War: the purchasing of wolfram in Spain and 
Portugal, which had incidentally brought about the first boom in wolfram production in the two Iberian countries. 
On Spanish tungsten during First Wolrd War, when its price rose from 2,535 pesetas per tonne in 1913 to 8,400 
in 1917 v. Leonardo Caruana de las Cagigas-Eduardo González Calleja, “La producción…..” cit., p. 190.
72 Wright, op.cit., p. 55.
73 Milward, op. cit., p. 48.
74 Late in 1943 Germany made other important strides to conserve tungsten by use of carbide cores in armour 
piercing projectiles: Eckes, A. E. Jr. (1979). The U.S. and the Global Struggle for Minerals. Austin: University of 
Texas Press, p. 116.
75 Milward, op. cit., p. 105.
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perience had shown that such 5cm shells were just sufficient to pierce the armour of the heavy 
Russian tanks. It appears that the most advanced and modern panzers –such as the Tiger– used 
shells able to perforate the Joseph Stalin-class Russian tank plating76. With the exception of 
these two shells, production of all other carbide-core calibres was stopped and all stocks were 
recalled to provide several tons of tungsten for machine-tool tips77. These were irreplaceable. 
Furthermore, it appears that Germany was prepared for the cessation of imports from the Ibe-
rian Peninsula. From 1943, it reduced its monthly consumption from 170 tons to 10078, which 
ensured reserves would last for between 17 and 40 months. Other measures taken to mitigate 
the loss of mainland imports were, in 1944, the exploitation of Germany’s own very low-quality 
mines, which yielded 35 tons in August 1944; the use of the French mines mentioned above, 
also poor; and a plan to increase transport of the mineral from Asia by U-boats79. Nevertheless, 
despite never really running out of supplies, Germany suffered from the reduction in the pro-
duction of shell tips that we have mentioned. It appears that one of the substitutes that was 
used instead of wolfram carbide at one stage –if the memoirs of former Minister of Armaments 
Speer are to be believed– was uranium80. 
The rationalization of the use of tungsten should be seen within the context of processes of sim-
plification, reorganization, arms standardization, improvement in the distribution of raw materials, 
increased automation, wastage reduction, the concentration of factories producing the same pro-
duct –all without compromising quality–81 measures implemented first by Minister Funk, and later, 
in a more systematic and efficient manner, by Speer, Minister of Ammunition. Even though the US 
believed the minimum amount of tungsten needed by the German economy was 3,500 tonnes82, 
it is clear that they were able to work with less83. A critical shortage of tungsten never occurred84.
As we have mentioned, the Allies’ pre-emptive purchase of Portuguese85 and Spanish wolfram 
ore played an important role in diminishing the amounts obtained by Germany. In Portugal, the 
76 Caruana, L., & Rockoff, H. (2003). A Wolfram in Sheep’s Clothing: Economic Warfare in Spain, 1940-1944. The 
Journal of Economic History 63, 1, 118.
77 Milward, op. cit., 105.
78 Leitz, op. cit., p. 196. A reduction from 170 to 120 (30th July 1943) and from 135 to 100 (1944) see Ibidem, p. 195.
79 Ibid., 194.
80 Speer, A. (2001). Memorias. Barcelona: Acantilado, p. 420. Depleted uranium is used as a substitute for tungsten in 
shells today, due to the fact that it also possesses extremely high density and hardness; however, depleted uranium 
catches fire inside tanks and causes contamination, while tungsten shells pierce without catching fire. Like tungsten, 
uranium is also used to manufacture tank armour. http://www.portierramaryaire.com/arts/proyectiles_tanque_2.php
81 Overy, R. (1994). War and economy in the Third Reich. Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 343.
82 Requirements: The insurmountable minimum of German tungsten requirements for industrial uses is estimated 
at 3500 tons of concentrates. Any tungsten possessed by Germany in excess of this amount may be diverted to 
the production of tungsten carbide cores for armour-piercing projectiles: Telegram American Embassy (London) 
to Secretary of State. November 16th, 1943. RG 234 Records of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. United 
States Commercial Corporation. Field Preclusive Operations. File 1942-1945. National Archives and Records 
Administration (NARA-2). 
83 Imperial War Museum IWM-D FD4733/45, p. 30, quoted in Eric Bernard Golson, The Economics of Neutrality: 
Spain, Sweeden and Switzerland in the Second World War (Ph d Diss, Department of Economic History, London 
School of Economics and Political Science, 2011), p. 192. 
84 Zilbert, E. R. (1981). Albert Speer and the Nazi Ministry of Arms. Economic Institutions and Industrial Production in 
the German War Economy. London: Associated University Presses, p. 39.
85 Most wolfram deposits in Portugal are located to the north of the country, next to the north-west and eastern 
borders with Spain.
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largest European tungsten producer86, the Allies always received greater quantities of exports 
than Germany, as shown in this table:
Table 6.  Exports of Portuguese wolfram concentrates (65 % wo3) (tons)
1940 % 1941 % 1942 % 1943 % 1944 %  1940-44  % 
To Germany 185,2 5,4 1814,3 34,7 2168,9 45,2 1342,3 20 701,4 27,2 6212,2  27,2
UK 1782,9 51,8 2363,3 45,1 2589,4 53,9 5321,4 80 1986,9 73,9     14043,9 61,5
USA 768,4 22,3 847,7 16,2 1762,1 7,7
Source: Comércio Externo quoted in Joao Paulo Avelas Neves (2010): O Estado Novo e o Volfrâmio (1933-1947).  
oimbra: Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra, p. 392.  
In fact, Germany did not enter the market for Portuguese wolfram until the defeat of 
France, but very quickly, in only six months, it had succeeded in establishing itself and 
taking a prominent position within it. Its presence would continue from then on until the 
market was closed, in mid-194487. But in Portugal –just as in China and Spain– there was 
also a black market. In the two Iberian countries, it was organised by the two opposing 
sides; and in the case of the wolfram intended for Nazi Germany, it benefited from the 
covert participation of both Portuguese and Spanish authorities. In Portugal the trade was 
linked to the secret acquisition of German heavy weaponry88 by the Estado Novo, involving 
nominally private companies that were in fact German, such as Minero-Silvícola Lda (with 
its head office in Lisboa); the Sociedad Financiera e Industrial SOFINDUS (with its head 
office in Madrid); and the Rohstoff-Waren-Kompensation Handelsgesellschaft ROWAK 
(with its head office in Berlin)89. Wolfram was also smuggled between Portugal and Spain, 
a trade driven by the higher prices paid in Spain, where purchases were tax-free, whereas 
in Portugal they were taxed90. 
Table 7. German and Allied exports and sales of wolfram in Portugal (tons)
Wolfram production (tons)
Year Anglo-American Mines German Mines Free Mines Total 
1942-1943 2,906 1,080 1,112 5,098
1943-44 4,009 904 1,304 6,217
Wolfram Exports (tons)
Year To Anglo-America To Germany German Share (%) 
1942-1943 3,184 1,915  37
86 Li-Wang, op. cit., p. 419.
87 Avelas Nunes, J. P. (2010). O Estado Novo e o Volfrâmio (1933-1947). Coimbra: Imprensa da Universidade de 
Coimbra, p. 393.
88 Ibidem, p. 418.
89 Ibid., p. 419-420.
90 José Miguel Ruiz Morales (1946). La economía del bloque hispano-portugués. Madrid: Instituto de Estudios 
Políticos, p. 234; António José Telo (1991). Portugal na Segunda guerra mundial (1941-1945) (vol. 1). Lisboa: 
Editorial Vega, p. 214-215; Leitz, op. cit., p. 171, n4.
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1943-44 4,660.5 1,535.5 25.02
Wolfram Trade with Germany (tons)
Year Quota in Agreement Actual Exports (tons)      
1942-1943 2,400 1,915      
1943-44 2,100 1,535.5
Source: Mapas references ao wolfrâmio e notas elucidativas. Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, March 9, 1944 cit. 
in Melissa Teixeira (2008). Caught on the Perifery: Portuguese Neutrality during World War II and Anglo-American 
Negotiations with Salazar, Senior Thesis, University of Pennsylvania, p. 137.
In contrast to Portugal, in Spain91 Germany was able to purchase and export more wolfram 
than the Allies until 1942. Later, during 1943, Germany was overtaken. But in 1944, thanks 
to smuggling, Germany was able again to export more mineral than the UK and the USA, as 
shown in this tab
Table 8. Relative success of Allied pre-emptive buyings in Spain (1941-1944) (tons)
Year
Spanish Wolfram ore 
production (content 
Wolfram 60-65 %)
German exports/acquisition Allied exports/acquisition Prince
1941 503.6 318/800 20/72 Between 2,590-65,000 pes/ton
1942 1,475.5 794/805 438/771 Between 125,000-160,000 pes/ton
1943 3,618.7 834.3/1,309 943/3,021 Between 170,000-275,000 pes/ton
1944 -
843,6 tons exported during 1944 
according to German sources/
without figure acquisition, but 
1,031 tons stockpiled in August 
1944, which had failed to be 
exported, or a minimum of 970 
exported during 1944 according 
to the estimate of Joan Maria 
Thomàs or 970, plus 1,031 
stockpiled 336/1,088
336 until April 7/
of 1,088 acquired 
until April or 336.6 




Source: Reproduced from Leitz, Economic Relations…cit., p. 176 with the quantity (970) calculated by Joan Maria 
Thomàs. The figures marked with an asterisk correspond to those found in the United States Commercial Corpora-
tion document “Wolfram and Scheelite Acquired in Spain from USCC-UKCC Joint Account”, March 20, 1944. 
Hayes Papers. Table 8 is reproduced from Thomàs, op. cit., 124. 
As regards smuggling, in Spain too, it was tolerated –and even encouraged– by some in autho-
rity, even by some ministers, as it seems may have been the case with the Minister of Com-
merce and Industry, Demetrio Carceller Segura92. In fact, even during the “Battle for Wolfram” 
mentioned above, which meant that from January to May 1944, due to Allied pressure, Spain 
was forced to suspend tungsten exports to either side, it continued to be sold and the covert 
91 Spain’s wolfram deposits are mainly concentrated in the northwest (Galicia and the northwestern provinces of 
Castilla) and the west (Extremadura), all of which areas are within provinces that border Portugal.
92 About this question see Thomàs, op. cit., p. 132.
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transportation of wolfram ore to Germany continued to be allowed, although in lower quantities 
than the Nazis would have been able to obtain under normal conditions. 
The result of the “Battle” was a huge reduction in the amount of wolfram that Spain sold 
to Germany and the Allies (even though, as we know, the Allies did not need it), together 
with the discontinuation of Portuguese wolfram exports ordered by the Salazar government 
one month later, in June 1944. This was accompanied, to the detriment of Germany, by the 
gradual retreat of its troops from French territory as the country was liberated by the Allies 
and the Résistance, with the resultant loss of the overland transport route between the two 
countries via France. Altogether this entailed an almost complete halt of the entrance of 
Iberian wolfram into the Third Reich. During the second half of 1944 and the first months of 
1945 only very small amounts would arrive from the Iberian peninsula, whether by air or by 
submarine, which were joined by small quantities arriving from the East in U-boats. The end 
result was that, until its defeat, small amounts of tungsten were still available to Nazi Ger-
many, meaning that it did not have to suspend production of two kinds of anti-tank grenade, 
or the manufacture and use of some essential components of indispensable machine tools, 
although in quantities far less than those the country’s war industries required –and in fact 
had had during the first phase of the conflict–. 
4. Conclusion
Wolfram/tungsten was not by any means the most important strategic material among those 
used by the principal combatants in the Second World War. Neither in terms of the quantities 
in which it was used (amply exceeded by other materials, such as oil and rubber products) nor 
of its indispensability –in which sense it was surpassed by chrome, tin and aluminium, among 
others–. However, tungsten was essential in the manufacture of some machine tool compo-
nents, in increasing the piercing/destructive power of certain types of shell, and in strengthe-
ning armour.
The specific characteristics of wolfram meant that the Great Powers –who had used it during 
the Great War– built up strategic stockpiles during the inter-war period, in case of new con-
flicts. This began with Nazi Germany –the aggressor power par excellence during the last two 
years of the 1930s and the first half of the next decade– which bought tungsten from China 
between 1936 and 1939. As did the Soviet Union between 1938 and 1941, and even after this 
date. For its part, the United States, which had deposits within its own territory, nevertheless 
worked to stockpile reserves, acquiring wolfram from China, India, Portugal and Spain93. The 
United Kingdom had large quantities in its Eastern colonies, in Burma and Malaya. Japan, 
which had none within its own territory but in territory it had annexed, the Korean peninsula, 
stimulated and increased extraction of the mineral while at the same purchasing it in China 
–first legally and then, after its invasion of the country in 1937, illegally– as well as in Hong 
Kong and other colonies until 1941. The Japanese also had plans –which they would eventually 
carry out– for a future conquest of the rich deposits of raw materials in the Dutch East Indies, 
Burma and Malaya. Wolfram was not their overriding objective –rather it was oil and rubber– 
but it was still an important one. 
93 Marshall, op. cit., p. 33 and following.
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When war broke out in Europe on 1 September 1939 there was no indication of what would 
eventually happen in Nazi Germany: a progressive and significant decline in its tungsten re-
serves, stockpiled over the three preceding years, which would force a reduction in its use. In 
fact, the Germans had found abundant reserves of raw materials in the countries it conquered 
during the first years of the war, and in particular, in France, wolfram mines. Furthermore, until 
1941 the Germans received wolfram from China, thanks to the agreements with the Soviet 
Union and Japan. But during the second half of 1941 things were to change. By attacking the 
USSR, Germany lost it as a source of tungsten supplies and as an overland link to China. At the 
same time, China broke off relations with Germany after this attack. 
From this time onwards, Germany depended primarily on wolfram from Portugal and Spain – 
where it had been purchasing it since 1936, in smaller amounts. They were friendly dictators-
hips but in this matter their actions were markedly opportunistic94, placing their own interests 
first and allowing competition for the mineral between Germany, the United Kingdom and the 
United States. This represented a lucrative trade for both Iberian states and for many private 
interests, including senior figures within their respective governments. This competition re-
sulted in the Germans obtaining smaller quantities than would otherwise have been possible, 
which contributed to the depletion of their reserves and a restriction of the use of wolfram to 
two specific calibres of shells and essential machine tool parts.
As for Japan, after Pearl Harbor, it effected the eagerly awaited conquests of British and Dutch 
colonies on the Asian continent and its islands, but proved to have limited ability to take advan-
tage of tungsten deposits that retreating armies had rendered unusable. This was compounded 
by their patchy and imperfect control of sea routes between conquered areas and the Japanese 
mainland, besieged by Allied naval forces and aviation. It thus had to depend mainly on the 
exploitation of Korean wolfram, which it increased, as well as on smuggled Chinese tungsten.
For its part, The United States, immediately after being attacked by Japan in December 1941, 
made a great leap forward in its raw material procurement policies. In the case of tungsten, it 
offered to purchase the entirety of China’s tungsten output, which it in fact went on to do over 
the years that followed. But from the outset, it encountered great difficulties in extracting the 
mineral from China, given that the speedy Japanese victories in Burma closed off the Burma 
Road and sea routes to the West. In order to surmount these obstacles, the US came up with 
the idea of an airlift –the Hump– which for three years would carry wolfram and other minerals 
from China to India, using the same aircraft to carry military supplies on the return trip. When 
it arrived in India, and then the United States, the tungsten was distributed among their own 
war industries and also to those of the USSR and the United Kingdom. These Allied countries 
thus came to depend almost entirely on the United States for their procurement of wolfram. 
Furthermore, the US government stimulated production in their own tungsten mines, vastly in-
creasing the volume being extracted, whilst also diversifying their purchases to other producer 
countries in the western hemisphere including Bolivia and Argentina. The result was a build-up 
of reserves and a level of use on scale that was unheard-of, especially in the United States, but 
also in general on the Allied side. These levels of use stood in contrast to those on the Axis side, 
where they were falling. Germany was suffering from the depletion of its reserves and had to 
ration its use of the mineral to maintain production of what was strictly essential, while Japan 
94 See Golson, op. cit., p. 465.
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saw its own wolfram shortage become chronic, and eventually was able to cover only 65 % of 
its needs.
In view of all this, it seems plausible to conclude that the unequal distribution both of tungs-
ten production and the accumulation of tungsten reserves during the Second World War was 
a factor that contributed to the Allied victory. In no sense was it a decisive factor, but it was 
important, given the usefulness and effectiveness of the weapons it was used to manufacture, 
and its use in war industries in general. For Nazi Germany, during the last years of the war, 
the decisive factors would in fact be the collapse in synthetic oil production, the breakdown in 
overland communications, and the destruction of important industrial areas, such as the Ruhr, 
by Allied aviation. These derived from two principal causes, Allied air supremacy and the de-
vastating attrition and losses among land forces on the Eastern front95. Equally decisive, in this 
case in the Japanese defeat, was the collapse of maritime communications. 
The Allies invested a great deal of energy and money in achieving a reduction in German pro-
curement of wolfram in Iberia, via preventive purchasing, and, during the last year of the war, 
by initiating the “Battle for Wolfram” in Spain. They also succeeded in obliging Portugal to 
suspend its sales to both sides, all this in mid-1944, in other words at a late stage in the con-
flict, when the final outcome was becoming clearer and clearer. And in fact, the United States, 
after resolving the wolfram question, exerted pressure to interrupt the sale of other vital raw 
materials to the enemy –Turkish chrome, Swedish iron and Swiss products–. Again, they were 
successful. It was the last year of the war and Allied victory was already in sight. Even so, until 
that time, opportunism, cronyism and self-protection –all of which were present to different 
degrees in the relations between Neutral countries and Germany– were constant themes, and 
the ongoing procurement of strategic minerals a tangible reality. 
At the same time it is worth pointing out that the procurement of raw and strategic materials 
to build up stockpiles sufficient for prolonged warfare never occupied the first place in Hitler’s 
calculations. This was not the case with other German strategists (both military and civilian), 
who were concerned about the country’s lack of preparation in this respect. The Fuhrer, by con-
trast, never foresaw warfare of this nature, instead short, lightning-fast wars –Blitzkrieg– with 
the possible exception of the great war he intended to wage in the future against the ‘mongrel’ 
nation par excellence, the United States96. He intended to initiate this war a few years after 
the defeat of the USSR, a defeat he imagined following a short campaign –like the defeat of 
France– but in this calculation he was wildly incorrect. In the end, he would be defeated by 
a combination of the human potential of the Soviets and the vast North American arsenal, an 
arsenal that was based, to a large extent, on resources possessed in greater abundance by the 
Allies than by the Axis. And these included wolfram/tungsten. 
95 Overy, R. (2005). Por qué ganaron los Aliados. Barcelona: Tusquets.
96 Norman J. W. Goda (1998). Tomorrow the World. Hitler, Northwest Africa, and the Path towards America. College 
Station: Texas A&M; Gerhard L. Weinberg (1994). A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
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